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SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITY AND NON-
ECONOMIC COMMERCE: TOWARD A NEW
THEORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Jason Everett Goldberg*
INTRODUCTION
The federal government was designed to be one of enumerated
and limited powers.1 One such enumerated power is Congress'
ability to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause. / During the United States' economic expansion and
societal evolution in the twentieth-century, Congress increasingly
enacted legislation under the Commerce Clause to address issues
that the nation's founders could never have foreseen.3 Despite
Brooklyn Law School Class of 2001; B.A. Union College, 1998.
See Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 582-83 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining
why the founders of the federal government wanted the national government to
be one of limited and enumerated powers); Michael Peter Hatzimichalis, Note,
Sovereignty, Federalism and Property in the Balance: A Paradox in the Making,
8 J.L. & POL'Y 707, 708 (2000) (noting that "[o]ur national government is a
government of enumerated and defined powers").
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the authority "[tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes").
3 Hatzimichalis, supra note 1, at 708 (commenting that "[t]he peaks and
valleys of the exercise and definition of federal power have been influenced by
countless exogenous variables: from changes to our social fabric, norms, mores,
and economic plight to vogue academic and constitutional methodologies");
Margaret Lupkes, Constitutional Law - Federal Commerce Power: Striking Down
the Gun Free School Zones Act as Beyond Congressional Power; United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), 72 N.D. L. REv. 1081, 1083 (1996)
(explaining that "[a]t the turn of the twentieth century, in response to ... the
industrialization of American society, Commerce Clause adjudication became
more frequent as the amount of federal legislation increased"); Melinda M.
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federalism 4 serving as a significant underlying tenet of American
governmental structure,5 for approximately six decades following
the heyday of the New Deal in the 1930's,6 Congress, without
Renshaw, Comment, Choosing Between Principles of Federal Power: The Civil
Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 47 EMORY L.J. 819, 823
(1998) (stating that "[a]s the localized, agrarian economy of the United States
evolved into a national economy driven by industrial concerns, Congress passed
numerous acts designed to regulate various aspects of industry, transportation,
and technology").
Some commentators have criticized the federalization of various criminal
activities under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Derek A. Kurtz, Comment,
Does the Violence Against Women Act Do Violence to the Limits of Congressio-
nal Power?, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1047, 1059 (1997) (delineating a summary
of criminal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause); H. Scott Wallace, The
Drive to Federalize Is a Road to Ruin, 8 CRIM. JUST. 8 (1993) (criticizing the
federalization of crimes for its impact on federalism and citing the civil rights
provision of VAWA as one such example of this drive).
4 See Dennis M. Cariello, Note, Federalism for the New Millennium:
Accounting for the Values of Federalism, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1494
(1999) (observing that the division of power between the federal and state
governments, an arrangement, "known as federalism, was the Framers' unique
contribution to political science and theory"). Moreover, "[t]he central issue of
federalism.., is whether any realm is left open to the States by the Constitution
- whether any area remains in which a State may act free of federal interfer-
ence." Id. at 1493. See also Adam S. Halpern, Note, New York, Printz, and the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act: Has Congress Commandeered the State
Departments of Motor Vehicles?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 233 (1999) (noting that
"[flederalism refers to the set of issues that define the balance of power between
the national government and the individual state governments in the United
States").
' See L. Morrow Christian, Sovereign Immunity Cases Change Balance of
Power, New York State Bar News, Mar./Apr. 2000, at 33 (noting that "[t]he
division between states' rights activists and federalists goes back to the
founders"); Jennifer Lynn Crawford, Note, America's Dark Little Secret:
Challenging the Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Provision of the 1994
Violence Against Women Act, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 189, 198 (1997) (comment-
ing that "the founding fathers envisioned a national government possessing
distinct powers separate from those of the states") (citation omitted).
6 See Karen Tichenor, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Continued
Confusion Over the Scope of the Commerce Cause, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
329, 336 (1997) (stating that "[t]o combat the Great Depression, Congress passed
federal legislation based on Commerce Clause regulatory authority").
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judicial interference,' increasingly enacted legislation under a
broad interpretation of its power to regulate interstate commerce.8
This unprecedented and unfettered ability to enact legislation
seemed limitless 9 until the April 1995 Supreme Court ruling in
United States v. Lopez."° This landmark decision" invalidated
7 Mitchell S. Lustig, Rehnquist Redefines the Commerce Clause, N.Y.L.J.
Aug. 28, 2000, at A4 (noting that as the twentieth-century passed, the Supreme
Court increasingly deferred to congressional judgment if Congress "determined
that there was need for legislation to remedy a problem of national concern").
8 See, e.g., Bradley A. Harsch, Brzonkala, Lopez, and the Commerce Clause
Canard: A Synthesis of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 29 N.M.L. REv. 321,
321 (1999) (stating that "[t]hough the constitutional structure of enumerated
powers was intended to limit the scope of federal power to certain specifically-
described domains, Congress has passed a number of laws under the Commerce
Clause that are, at best, only tenuously related to its power to regulate interstate
commerce").
9 See Judi L. Lemos, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: Connecting
Gender-Motivated Violence to Interstate Commerce, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REv.
1251, 1255 (1998).
Some scholars argue that Congress has long used the Commerce
Clause to pass legislation beyond the authority granted by the Constitu-
tion, while others contend that Congress's commerce power is so broad
that, as long as a rational basis exists to connect an activity to
interstate commerce, any legislation is constitutional.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
'0 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez involved a case against a twelfth grade high
school student in San Antonio, Texas, who was arrested for "carrying a
concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets" into the school. Id. at 551. State
charges were filed but subsequently dropped when respondent was charged by
the federal government for violating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990. Id.
The district court convicted respondent but "[t]he Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit... reversed respondent's conviction.... [and] held that, in light of what
it characterized as insufficient congressional findings and legislative history,$section 922(q), in the full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause."' Id. at 552 (citing United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-1368 (5th Cir. 1993)).
" Bill Burdett, U.S. Supreme Court Review - At the Slaughterhouse Door:
The Supreme Court's Narrow View of Federal Authority, 79 MICH. B.J. 1220,
1220 (2000) (commenting that Lopez "dramatically altered the course of
commerce clause jurisprudence"); Donald C. Massey, Proposed On-Board
Recorders for Motor Carriers: Fostering Safer Highways or Unfairly Tilting the
Litigation Playing Field?, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 463 (2000) (noting that "[flor
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that part of the Gun Free School Zone Act ("GFSZA") 2 that had
made it a federal offense to possess a gun within a school zone.13
For five years following Lopez, speculation abounded in
academic journals 4 as to whether Lopez was an aberration 5 or,
rather, reflected a shift from a laissez-faire Supreme Court to a
more activist Court 16 in evaluating the constitutionality of statutes
enacted under the Commerce Clause.'7 Specifically, activism by
years, most observers believed that the Supreme Court would never strike down
a law as exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause: that power
was thought to be plenary").
12 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1). The
original version of the GFSZA made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
'3 See 514 U.S. at 551 ("hold[ing] [that] the Act exceeds the authority of
Congress '[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States"') (citing U.S.
CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
"4 See Anna Johnson Cramer, Note, The Right Results for all the Wrong
Reasons: An Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53
VAND. L. REv. 271, 273 (2000) (stating that "Lopez surprised many scholars,
prompting a rampage of commentary on the decision and the constitutionality of
particular federal statutes"); Harsch, supra note 8, at 326 (noting that "much
scholarly debate [was triggered] over whether Lopez would prove historically
significant as a limitation on the commerce power") (footnote omitted).
"5 See Troy Robert Rackham, Note, Enumerated Limits, Normative
Principles, and Congressional Overstepping: Why the Civil Rights Provision of
the Violence Against Women Act Is Unconstitutional, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 447, 464 (2000) (stating that "[the] Lopez [decision] was simply an
aberrational response [by the Court] to the cavalier manner in which Congress
passed the GFSZA").
16 See Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong
With Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REv. 201, 201 (2000)
(commenting that "[t]he animating impulse of this 'contemporary activism is an
interest in reviving the structural guarantees of dual sovereignty,' that is, in
protecting the vitality of 'states as entities having residual sovereign rights"').
(footnote omitted). Professor Shane further notes that "[d]elineating the
respective spheres of national and state regulatory authority has been one of the
Supreme Court's most enduring preoccupations." Id. at 203.
17 See Alexander Dombrowsky, Comment, Whether the Constitutionality of
the Violence Against Women Act Will Further Federal Protection from Sexual
Orientation Crimes, 54 U.MIAMi L. REV. 587, 598 (2000) (stating that "[s]ome
argue that Lopez will result in few changes, and ... view the decision [as] an
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the Court in evaluating statutes that attempted to regulate what
seemingly are intrastate non-commercial or non-economic activities
through the lens of federalism. 8 To others, the Lopez decision did
not come as a surprise given the pro-federalism ideology the Court
had had in recent years, 9 as it re-emphasized the Tenth Amend-
ment as "a guardian of state sovereignty. 20
The answer as to Lopez's significance finally came in May 2000
with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison,2'
which held the civil rights provision of the Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA"), 22 to be unconstitutional. The civil rights
provision, Section 13981,23 created a private cause of action for
incongruent anomaly .... [while] [others believe the decision will spark a return
to federalism"); Debbie Ellis, Case Note, A Lopez Legacy?: The Federalism
Debate Renewed, But Not Resolved, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 85, 121 (1996)
(stating that "Lopez may... signal a major change in constitutional law"); Sally
F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 68 (2000) (commenting that "Lopez... reveals a deep concern about
issues of federalism, and especially about federal intrusion in areas traditionally
controlled by the states"); Hatzimichalis, supra note 1, at 732 (stating that
"[a]fter Lopez, the Court is, once again, taking the lead in judicially defining and
preserving federalism as a task unto itself").
'8 See Ellis, supra note 17, at 102 (observing that "[t]he Court's conservative
majority, long concerned about federalism issues, saw a perfect opportunity in
Lopez to reign in Congress' power under the Commerce Clause").
19 See Joan Biskupic, Dispute May Test Power of Congress; Court to Review
Law on Gender Violence, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1999, at A3 (stating that "[in
a series of recent rulings, the Supreme Court has curtailed congressional power
in favor of the states").
20 Hatzimichalis, supra note 1, at 722 (footnote omitted). "The Tenth
Amendment... has been the linchpin of the Court's most recent stance toward
a judicial doctrine of federalism and social regulation." Id. (footnote omitted).
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review,
Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1283, 1283
(2000) (stating that the Supreme Court "has revived the Tenth Amendment as a
limit on Congress's powers to regulate state governments").
21 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
22 Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, § 40302, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1941.
23 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) provides:
(a) Purpose.
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as
567
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under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this
subtitle to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated
violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting
interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of
action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence.
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection
(d)).
(c) Cause of action.
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a
crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the
right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the
party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other
relief as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definition.
For purposes of this section -
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the
victim's gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means -
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony
against the person or that would constitute a felony against
property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical
injury to another, and that would come within the meaning
of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title
18, United States Code, whether or not those acts have
actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or convic-
tion and whether or not those acts were committed in the
special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the
United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a
felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship
between the person who takes such action and the individual
against whom such action is taken.
(e) Limitation and procedures.
(1) Limitation.
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under
subsection (c) of this section for random acts of violence
unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a
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victims of gender-motivated violence, thus permitting them to sue
their attacker(s) in federal court.24 Congress based its power to
enact Section 13981 on the Commerce Clause,2 5 using the same
reasoning it had used in enacting the GFSZA.2 6 Congress conclud-
ed that gender-based violence, like gun possession in school zones,
substantially affected interstate commerce.2 ' Despite Congress'
well documented findings and reasoning, Section 13981 was
criticized as being an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'
commerce powers because it did not directly regulate an economic
activity.2
8
preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within
the meaning of subsection (d).
(2) No prior criminal action.
Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint,
prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of
action under subsection (c).
(3) Concurrent jurisdiction.
The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
over actions brought pursuant to this subtitle.
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction.
Neither section 1367 of Title 28, United States Code, nor subsec-
tion (c) of this section shall be construed, by reason of a claim
arising under such subsection, to confer on the courts of the
United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the
establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of
marital property, or child custody decree.
Id. § 13981.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
25 Congress also invoked Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as its
authority to enact the civil rights remedy. See id. § 13981(a).
26 See Kurtz, supra note 3, at 1050 (stating that "Congress additionally relied
on its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the civil
rights cause of action"). This Note is limited to discussing the civil rights
provision as it relates to the Commerce Clause. See infra Part II.
27 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752; see also infra Section II.A (stating
Congress' reasoning in how gender-motivated violence impacted interstate
commerce).
28 See, e.g., Dombrowsky, supra note 17, at 588 (stating that "the VAWA
has been met by severe constitutional criticism [with] ... [o]pponents argu[ing]
that Congress overstepped its Commerce Clause powers by enacting the
VAWA").
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The Supreme Court in Morrison invalidated the civil rights
provision as exceeding Congress' ability to regulate under the
Commerce Clause primarily on two grounds. First, the Court
dismissed the plethora of congressional findings in Section 1398 I's
legislative history that purported to link "the serious impact of
gender-motivated violence on victims and their families, 29 to an
affect on interstate commerce. 30 The Court rejected the findings
because it determined that Congress relied on a "but-for"3
method of reasoning, which it had already rejected in Lopez as
being too attenuated.3 2 Second, the Court invalidated Section
13981 out of a fear that upholding it would potentially leave no
subject beyond Congress' power to regulate and would thus
obliterate the boundaries of federalism. 33
Although this Note contends that the Morrison Court was
correct in invalidating the civil rights provision, the Court can be
criticized for its manipulation of the traditional "rational basis"
standard of review to achieve its desired outcome - that is, striking
down Section 13981 without overruling any previously decided
Commerce Clause cases. 34 The rational basis test had come to be
the deferential test by which the constitutionality of legislation
enacted under the Commerce Clause was evaluated.35 Under that
test, the Court would look to see whether Congress' determination
that an activity impacted interstate commerce was rational and if
29 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.
30 See id. at 1752-53.
3" See id. at 1751, 1753.
32 Id. at 1752.
3 See id. at 1752-53.
3 This Note ultimately concludes that Morrison actually adopted a
heightened standard of review for intrastate non-economic activities, thus
replacing the rational basis standard.
" See Melissa Ann Jones, Note, Legislating Gun Control in Light of Printz
v. United States, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 455, 462 (1999) (stating that "[tlhe
Supreme Court applies an extremely deferential rational basis test when
reviewing congressional legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause")
(footnotes omitted).
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there was such a basis, whether the mechanism chosen by Congress
to address this activity was appropriate.36
While the Morrison Court claimed to be adhering to precedent
in conducting its evaluation, in reaching its conclusion, it actually
created a new standard of review under the Commerce Clause.
Furthermore, the Court did not articulate what considerations its
evaluation actually encompassed, thus leaving lawmakers bewil-
dered as to what is necessary in order for a statute regulating non-
economic interstate activity to withstand a constitutional challenge.
The Court's analysis seemingly differentiates between economic
and non-economic activity and will not allow regulation of the
latter even though there may be a rational basis to conclude that
the activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 37 Although
the Court specifically declined to "adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity' 38 to deter-
mine if the activity substantially affects interstate commerce, this
Note argues that the Court effectively did adopt a per se rule, and
that such a rule should not in fact be adopted.39
The new test that the Morrison Court used should be rejected
for its application would preclude the regulation of intrastate non-
economic activities that are claimed to substantially affect interstate
commerce in the aggregate. The Court, however, can still delineate
36 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59
(1964) (stating that the test for appropriate use of the commerce power asks "(1)
whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by
motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it
selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate").
" The import of Lopez and Morrison appears to be that the rational basis
test will not be applied to non-economic activities. See, e.g., Cramer, supra note
14, at 301 (stating that "Lopez created a distinction between economic and non-
economic activity, limiting Congress to the former").
38 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
" See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down
in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 123 (2000) (noting that
"[a]lthough [the Morrison Court]... declined to adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of noneconomic activity, by interpreting prior case law
as a limit on Congress's power to aggregate the effects of intrastate activity, the
Court effectively created the categorical rule it expressly disclaimed') (emphasis
added).
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the limits of congressional regulatory authority without adopting a
per se rule, thus leaving open the possibility to permit congressio-
nal regulation of such activity. In doing such, it is possible to reign
in the most expansive post-New Deal precedent - as the Lopez and
Morrison Courts were intent on doing - without resorting to a per
se rule. However, the regulation of such would still have to pass
scrutiny under the Court's independent evaluation.
In an attempt to reconcile the Morrison Court's ruling with
Commerce Clause precedent, this Note articulates a standard of
review to fill the void that was left ambiguous by Morrison with
regard to congressional regulation of non-economic intrastate
activity. While the heightened standard this Note proposes places
greater restrictions on congressional authority than existed under
the clear pre-Lopez Commerce Clause doctrine,4' this standard
would give Congress greater flexibility than a per se rule against
regulation of intrastate non-economic activities, which is what the
Court tacitly adopted in Morrison.41 The necessity for instituting
this heightened standard of review is the following: if the rational
basis test was honestly employed (rather than discarded) by the
Morrison Court, with proper judicial deference given to Section
13981's extensive legislative findings, it is easily conceivable that
gender-motivated violence could have been found to substantially
affect interstate commerce.42 However, due to significant and
40 See infra Part IV (proposing a standard of review for intrastate non-
economic activities).
41 There would be greater congressional flexibility under this proposed
standard because it would allow Congress to regulate intrastate non-economic
activities so long as Congress satisfies the Court's independent evaluation of
whether the activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759-60 (2000)
(Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter opined:
The fact of such a substantial effect is not an issue for the courts in the
first instance, but for the Congress, whose institutional capacity for
gathering evidence and taking testimony far exceeds ours. By passing
legislation, Congress indicates its conclusion, whether explicitly or not,
that facts support its exercise of the commerce power. The business of
the courts is to review the congressional assessment, not for soundness
but simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis
exists in fact. Any explicit findings that Congress chooses to make,
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valid federalism concerns and the limits of Commerce Clause
regulation, the Court should have taken the bold step and explicitly
articulated a new test and defined what the limits to it are, rather
than attempt to mutate the present standard of review without
acknowledging its tact.43
Section I of this Note briefly describes the GFSZA, reviews the
Supreme Court's analysis in Lopez, and recounts the uncertainty
and quagmire that the federal courts and academics were in
between Lopez and Morrison. Section II provides an overview of
Section 13981, how the civil rights provision was supposedly
enacted in such a way to insulate it from the same fate of the
GFSZA and analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison.
Section III presents three criticisms of the majority decision in
though not dispositive of the question of rationality, may advance
judicial review by identifying factual authority on which Congress
relied. Applying those propositions ... can lead to only one conclu-
sion.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Prof. Shane observes that:
[t]he findings in VAWA's legislative history] standing alone would
seem to sustain the VAWA readily under pre-Lopez doctrine. In
enacting the VAWA, Congress rationally concluded that acts of
gender-based violence, viewed cumulatively, place a substantial burden
on interstate commerce and that the availability of a civil damages
remedy would both reduce the resulting economic costs for the victims
of violence and deter some degree of gender-based brutality.
Shane, supra note 16, at 216-17. See also Cramer, supra note 14, at 301 (stating
"if the Court uses a rational basis test to review the statute, the heightened fact-
finding performed by Congress will permit the Court to regard [Section 13981]
as a constitutional exercise of Commerce Clause power") (footnote omitted).
43 If the Supreme Court employed this proposed standard of review in
Morrison, this Note contends that the Supreme Court could have reached the
same ultimate conclusion to invalidate Section 13981, but would have done so
without wreaking havoc on the standard of review. Under the Court's evaluation,
it appears that if a non-economic (or non-commercial) intrastate activity is
involved, the Court will not even reach the rational basis test. The Court will
simply invalidate the regulation if no jurisdictional hook is present. This is an
unacceptable approach and if a case does come before the Court that regulates
a non-economic intrastate activity but does not have any potential "causation
problems" like Section 13981 or the GFSZA, then the Court's reasoning will be
exposed.
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Morrison. Finally, section IV will propose an alternative analytical
framework that the Supreme Court could have adopted in deciding
the constitutionality of the civil rights provision, and ultimately
concludes that although the Court was correct in invalidating
Section 13981, further clarification by the Court is needed as to the
limits of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
I. THE LEGACY OF UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
Prior to United States v. Morrison there were varying conclu-
sions as to the constitutionality of the civil rights provision.'
These contradictory decisions were a result of the 1995 Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Lopez, which clouded the waters
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.45 According to some, and
apparent from the various district court rulings, "Lopez [had] ...
left lower courts without guidance in their efforts to analyze cases
based on the Commerce Clause."46
At issue in Lopez was a provision of the Gun Free School
Zones Act of 1990 that made it a federal offense "for any individu-
al knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. 47
Congress reasoned that aggregating the intrastate possession of
firearms in school zones across the nation substantially affected
interstate commerce.48 In its attempt to convince the Supreme
44 See, e.g., Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(stating that "[a] quick survey of the judicial and scholarly views on the
significance of Lopez indicates that this Court is not alone in its uncertainty
concerning how the Supreme Court will approach these issues when it considers
future challenges to congressional authority under the Commerce Clause")
(footnote omitted).
41 See Christine M. Devey, Casenote, Commerce Clause, Enforcement
Clause, or Neither? The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act in
Brzonkala v. Morrison, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 567, 581 (2000) (stating that "[the
civil rights provision] faced several challenges and '[a]lthough these courts
relied on Lopez, they reached different results, demonstrating the difficulty of
applying Lopez"') (footnote omitted).
46 Id.
41 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1).
48 The aggregation rationale is an outgrowth of the Supreme Court's decision
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Court to uphold the GFSZA as a valid exercise of its power to
regulate interstate commerce:
[t]he Government argue[d] that possession of a firearm in
a school zone may result in violent crime and that violent
crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the
national economy in two ways. First, the costs of violent
crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of
insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population.
Second, violent crime reduces the willingness of individu-
als to travel to areas within the country that are perceived
to be unsafe. The Government also argue[d] that the
presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to
the educational process by threatening the learning envi-
ronment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, will
result in a less productive citizenry. That, in turn, would
have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic well-
being.49
Opponents of the GFSZA rejected this "cost of crime" and
"national productivity" reasoning and argued that Congress
exceeded its authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause in
attempting to regulate an activity whose connection was tenuous at
best to interstate commerce.5°
in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942) (upholding the constitutionality
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as applied to federal regulation of
wheat). In Wickard, farmer Filburn grew wheat solely for home consumption and
this wheat would have otherwise been satisfied by his purchases in the open
market. The Court stated that, "even if appellee's activity be local and though it
may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."
Id. at 125. See also Charis Mincavage, Title III of the Violence Against Women
Act: Can It Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge in the Wake of United States
v. Lopez?, 102 DICK. L. REv. 441, 449-50 (1998) (stating that "[Wickard]
provided Congress great breadth to regulate many activities which alone would
not have a substantial effect on the economy but in the aggregate would have
such an effect on interstate commerce").
49 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (citations omitted).
50 See id. at 552; see also Johanna R. Shargel, In Defense of the Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106 YALE L.J. 1849, 1878 (1997)
(stating that "[aiccording to critics of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, the
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On April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, struck down the GFSZA, holding that it exceeded
Congress' ability to regulate activity under the Commerce
Clause. 51 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, authoring the majority
opinion, concluded that "[t]he Act neither regulate[d] a commercial
activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession [of a
firearm] be connected in any way to interstate commerce., 52
In evaluating the constitutionality of the GFSZA, the Lopez
Court reaffirmed that there are "three broad categories of activity
that Congress may regulate under its commerce power., 53 Con-
gress may "regulate the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce," the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and
"activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e.,
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 54
The Lopez Court concluded that for the GFSZA to be constitution-
al, "it must be under the third category as a regulation of an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce." 55 Under
this category, Congress may regulate a class of purely intrastate
activities, if this activity, in the aggregate, has a substantial affect
on interstate commerce. 6
After conducting its analysis under this category,57 the Lopez
Court rejected the government's reliance on the undocumented
connection between the "cost of crime" on "national productivity,"
because, if accepted, this argument would permit Congress to
Remedy is unconstitutional because it exceeds the well-defined scope of Section
One [of the Constitution]").
51 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (citing U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
52 Id.
51 Id. at 558.
4 Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
15 Id. at 559.
56 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258
(1964) (concluding that "the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce
also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local
activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a
substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce"). It remains to be seen
whether it is dispositive that this activity is commercial or non-commercial in
nature.
17 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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"regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might
lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to
interstate commerce., 5
8
A. Uncertainty as to Lopez's Significance
The Lopez Court's holding reverberated throughout Commerce
Clause jurisprudence because it was the first decision by the
Supreme Court in nearly sixty years to declare a statute passed by
Congress under the Commerce Clause to be unconstitutional.59
Lopez's impact on Commerce Clause jurisprudence was debated
immediately. 61 In addition to the overriding question of whether
federalism concerns would undermine further attempts to regulate
traditional areas of local concern, there were three additional areas
of uncertainty. First, to some, Lopez served as a reminder to
Congress that there were in fact limits to what it could regulate
under the Commerce Clause, while others considered Lopez to be
a mere aberration in sixty-plus years of non-interference with
Congress in regards to Commerce Clause regulation.6' Second,
58 Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
59 See, e.g., William Funk, The Lopez Report, 23-SUM ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS 1, 1 (Summer 1998). Professor Funk opined:
[T]he Supreme Court surprised much of the legal world... [because]
[flor nearly sixty years the Court had rejected claim-after-claim that a
statute violated the Commerce Clause, and observers had generally
come to believe that ... while there might be a theoretical limit on
Congress's power, there was no practical limit. Lopez proved that
Id. observation false.
60 See Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (stating that
"[Lopez's] impact on the limits of the commerce power [was] a hotly debated
issue"); Devey, supra note 45, at 573 (observing that "[s]cholars have disagreed
as to the impact Lopez will have on Commerce Clause precedent") (footnote
omitted).
6 See Antony Barone Kolenc, Commerce Clause Challenges After United
States v. Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REV. 867, 876 (1998) (noting that "[f]or many,
[Lopez] was confirmation that federalism was not dead and that Congress' powers
under the Commerce Clause were not plenary"); see also Hatzimichalis, supra
note 1, at 773 (stating that "[t]he Court has been at the vanguard of a movement
to enforce a vision of federalism in consonance with the Framers' writings, the
577
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there was uncertainty as to whether the outcome in Lopez would
have differed if there had in fact been congressional findings
present in the GFSZA's legislative history supporting the connec-
tion between gun possession in school zones to a negative impact
upon interstate commerce.62 Many courts and commentators
claimed that Lopez would probably have been decided differently
if Congress had accumulated legislative findings establishing that
the aggregate affect of gun possession in school zones could
substantially affect interstate commerce.63
text, structure, original understanding, and history of the Constitution").
62 The Lopez Court stated that to conclude that the GFSZA addressed a
problem that substantially affected interstate commerce would require the Court
to "pile inference upon inference" in a manner that would essentially make
Congress' power to regulate local non-economic activity under the guise of the
Commerce Clause limitless. 514 U.S. at 567. The Court stated that if the govern-
ment's argument was accepted, "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power ... even in areas ... where States historically have been
sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate." Id. at 564. See Jennifer C. Philpot, Note, Violence Against Women and
the Commerce Clause: Can This Marriage Survive? 85 K.Y. L.J. 767, 780
(1997) (stating that the Lopez Court rejected the government's reasoning because
acceptance of it would "permit Congress to regulate virtually all activities that
lead to violence crimes, regardless of their effects on interstate commerce").
63 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 684 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating that "[it is easy enough to imagine congressional findings that, if found
rational, could have made Lopez a very different case"); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F.
Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997); rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir.
1998). The Iowa district court observed:
[T]his court reads Lopez to have invalidated the [GFSZA], not because
it regulated non-commercial or non-economic activity, but because the
Court could not find that the non-commercial, non-economic activity
regulated had the requisite substantial effect upon interstate commerce,
since the regulation lacked either jurisdictional elements or supporting
legislative findings demonstrating that the activity had the necessary
substantial effect.
Id. at 1418 (citation omitted). See Judi L. Lemos, Comment, The Violence
Against Women Act of 1994: Connecting Gender-Motivated Violence to Interstate
Commerce, 21 SEA'ITLE U. L. REv. 1251, 1261 (1998) (concluding that Lopez
required congressional findings to establish a rational basis and hence the VAWA
would be found constitutional by the Supreme Court). Cf Santiago v. Alonso,
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This debate over the significance of congressional findings to
support federal regulation of non-economic activity was spurred on
by comments the Court made in the closing paragraph of Lopez.
The Court stated that "[t]o uphold the Government's contentions
here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner
that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States." ' Some commentators argued that these comments
regarding the absence of legislative findings by the majority were
"dicta" and that the outcome in Lopez would not have differed
even if such legislative findings were present.65
Third, and perhaps most importantly, it remained uncertain as
to whether the standard of review remained the rational basis
standard as articulated in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining.66
61, 67 (D. P.R. 2000) (rejecting interpretations of Lopez that concluded that the
decision hinged on the absence of congressional findings).
64 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
65 See, e.g., Christine Conover, The Violence Against Women Act: Stabilizing
Commerce Through a Civil Rights Remedy, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 269, 275
(1997) (noting that "the [Lopez] Court's dicta indicates that [it] may require the
government, or whoever supports the legislation at issue, to present legislative
findings in litigation"); Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence and
the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against
Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1876, 1910 (1996) (stating that the
District Court of Virginia, in ruling on Brzonkala, noted that "the lack of
findings in Lopez did not mandate the unconstitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act").
66 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (explaining that under the rational basis test
"[t]he court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding" and once
this established, "the only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether 'the
means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by
the Constitution"') (citations omitted); see Lori L. Shick, Comment, Breaking the
"Rule of Thumb" and Opening the Curtains - Can the Violence Against Women
Act Survive Constitutional Scrutiny?, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 887, 909-10 (1997)
(discussing how Lopez left much uncertainty in the appropriate standard of
review to be employed). "Lopez shed[] no light on whether the role of reviewing
courts of congressional regulation remains as it was articulated in Hodel, a
rational basis review." Id.
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Commentators 67 and courts 68 noted that the Lopez Court ap-
peared to apply a stricter test than the Hodel rational basis test,
which had previously been espoused as the appropriate level of
scrutiny for legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause. Justice
Souter in dissent also noted that the majority seemingly employed
a stricter degree of scrutiny by its distinguishing between commer-
cial and non-commercial activities.69 The majority did not indi-
cate, however, that it was overruling or modifying the rational basis
test, thus suggesting that it was affirming it.
70
Despite varying district court interpretations of Lopez and the
countless articles speculating over Lopez's significance, clarification
from the Supreme Court was not immediately forthcoming.
Although it was not known at the time, the Court's first opportunity
to clarify its holding in Lopez began to take form even before the
Lopez ruling was pronounced in 1995 with Congress' passage of
the Violence Against Women Act in 1994.71
67 See, e.g., Chris A. Rauschl, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
University: Violence Against Women, Commerce, and the Fourteenth Amendment
- Defining Constitutional Limits, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1601, 1611 (1997) (stating
that "[t]he Court in Lopez ... applied a heightened version of the rational basis
review").
6' According to the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444,
1459 (6th Cir. 1995), the Lopez Court appeared to apply a heightened standard
of review for "non-economic activity," rather than the rational basis test that had
previously been espoused by the Hodel Court for evaluating Commerce Clause
legislation. The Wall Court added that "[though there is obviously nothing in
Lopez to indicate that the Court was applying strict scrutiny, the Court was
definitely not applying minimal, rational basis scrutiny to the GFSZA." Id. For
a discussion of secondary sources discussing whether Lopez espoused a higher
level of scrutiny for legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause, see id. at
1459.
69 See Lopez 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court
treats deference under the rationality rule as subject to gradation according to the
commercial or noncommercial nature of the immediate subject of the challenged
regulation").
70 See Tichenor, supra note 6 at 331 (stating that "the Supreme Court [in
Lopez] did not overrule the rational basis test to determine whether a federal
statute is within the Commerce Clause, but in fact reaffirmed the test").
71 See supra note 22.
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II. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
The Violence Against Women Act was proposed in 199072
and was passed in September 1994.7' The impetus to enact the
civil rights provision was the recognition of widespread violence
against women74 and because women were facing a pervasive
inability to obtain recourse in state courts for such acts.75 As such,
Congress decided that federal action was appropriate and would not
violate principles of federalism since the states had not taken
sincere action in this area.76 "Congress was concerned that
gender-based acts of violence were sufficiently widespread and
unchecked as to significantly and negatively affect commerce
among the states. 77 The subsequent enactment of the VAWA and
72 See S. REP. 101-545 (1990). Senator Joseph Biden, from the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, first proposed the Violence Against Women Act in
a 1990. Id. Senator Biden stated that "[i]t is time to take on this national outrage,
and it is time to deal with it and make people aware of it." Id.
71 See S. REP. No. 104-343 (1996). The Violence Against Women Act was
passed as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
and President Clinton signed the bill into law on September 14, 1994. Id.
14 See Lisa M. Fitzgerald, The Violence Against Women Act: Is it an
Effective Solution?, 1 How. SCROLL 46, 50 (1993) (commenting that "[tihe
problem of violence against women is a national crisis which has not been
successfully remedied by the state legal system").
71 See Maloney, supra note 65, at 1885 (stating that "Congress recognized
both the scope of the problem of gender-motivated violence and that existing
[state] law did not provide an adequate solution"); Melanie L. Winskie, Note,
Can Federalism Save the Violence Against Women Act?, 31 GA. L. REv. 985,
985-86 (1997). "In states across the country, victims of gender-based violence
are systematically mistreated by both the courts and the police: judges and law
enforcement officers mock domestic abuse and rape victims by belittling their
testimony, and police and prosecutors frequently refuse to enforce the law on
their behalf." Id. See also Kurtz, supra note 3, at 1100 (commenting that
"[v]iolence against women is a despicable [and] disheartening, and .. .[iut is
only natural for legislators to want to do something to prevent its occurrence").
76 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43 (1991).
77 Ericson v. Syracuse University, 45 F. Supp. 2d 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(holding the civil rights provision constitutional under the Commerce Clause);
see S. REP. No. 102-197, at 36 (1991) (discussing the distressing prevalence of
rape and abuse of women in the United States).
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Section 13981 was viewed as giving "victims of workplace
violence and sexual harassment a powerful legal sword" and
"tell[s] victims that the nation takes their plight seriously."78
Although the VAWA has numerous provisions,79 it was Section
13981 that was repeatedly challenged from its enactment as
exceeding Congress' power to enact legislation under the Com-
merce Clause. 80
A. The Civil Rights Provision - Section 13981
The civil rights provision was a novel approach to address
gender-motivated violence in the United States.8' It provided
victims of gender-motivated violence82 with a private cause of
action to sue their assailant(s) in federal court to recover "compen-
78 David M. Fine, Note, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The
Proper Federal Role in Policing Domestic Violence, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 252,
302 (1998).
'9 For a discussion of the various provisions of the VAWA, see Leonard
Karp & Laura C. Belleau, Federal Law and Domestic Violence: The Legacy of
the Violence Against Women Act, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 173, 178-81
(1999).
80 See Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment
Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1099
(1998) (noting that "[the] VAWA... has been plagued by objections based on
federalism").
81 See S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 42 (1991) (noting that "Title III of the
Violence Against Women Act provides the first civil rights remedy for serious
'gender-based' violence, allowing any victim of such a crime to bring a Federal
action against their attacker for damages and other relief"); Celia Guzaldo
Gamrath, Enforcing Orders of Protection Across State Lines, 88 ILL. B.J. 452
(2000) (stating that "the civil rights remedy, was a historic, ground-breaking civil
rights provision"); Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a
Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J.
123, 128 (1999) (stating that the "VAWA contains an historic civil rights
provision").
82 The act of violence must have been specifically motivated by a gender
animus and not simply a random act. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994); see
also Jennifer Gaffney, Note, Amending the Violence Against Women Act:
Creating a Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. &
POL'Y 247 (1997) (arguing that Congress should amend VAWA such that a
rebuttable presumption of gender animus exists in all rape cases).
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satory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and
such other relief as a court may deem appropriate. 83 Prior to
enacting the VAWA, congressional committees heard a plethora of
testimony on the affects violence on women has on the national
economy and interstate commerce.84 Since Congress has no
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
Congress heard testimony from "law enforcement officials, anti-domestic
violence organizations, rape crisis centers, psychiatrists, other mental health
experts, physicians, law professors, staff attorneys from legal advocacy groups,
state Attorneys General, and victims of domestic violence." Doe v. Doe, 929 F.
Supp. 608, 611 (D. Conn. 1996) (commenting on the extent of congressional
findings claiming that gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce);
see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at 154-155 (1993).
THE AUTHORITY: CONGRESS HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER TO ENACT TITLE III
Congress's power to enact title Ill is firmly based on the Commerce
Clause and on section 5 of the 14th Amendment. Scholars have
testified that the constitutional basis for this remedy is sound. A Prof.
Cass Sunstein concluded, "the constitutional objections to the bill are
quite weak. * * * we are talking here about something that is in the
core of the Equal Protection Clause as it was originally understood *
1. The Commerce Clause
There is no doubt that the Congress has the power to create
the title III remedy under the Constitution's Commerce Clause.
The Commerce Clause is a broad grant of power allowing
Congress to reach conduct that has even the slightest effect on
interstate commerce; Congress need only have a "rational basis"
for creating such a law.
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to act
even if the proposed law, on its face, does not directly effect
"commerce." Civil rights laws and Federal criminal laws have
both been created based on Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause. Congress's power under the Commerce Clause also
reaches conduct that may seem purely local in nature. For
example, street corner sales of home-manufactured drugs can be
made illegal by Congress because of the Commerce Clause
power.
Gender-based violent crimes meet the modest threshold
required by the Commerce Clause. Gender-based crimes and the
fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement, reduces employ-
ment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces
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general police power to utilize,85 Congress purported to enact
Section 13981 under its power to regulate interstate commerce,
reasoning that individual acts of gender-motivated violence in the
aggregate substantially affected interstate commerce. 86 In enacting
the civil rights provision under the guise of the Commerce Clause,
Congress stated that:
[c]rimes of violence motivated by gender has a substantial
adverse effect on interstate commerce, by deterring
potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging
in employment in interstate business and from transacting
with business, and in places involved in interstate com-
merce;... by diminishing national productivity, increasing
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and
the demand for interstate products.87
After numerous district courts predominantly upheld Section
1398188 and one circuit court invalidated it,89 the Supreme Court
consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and
the national economy. Gender-based violence bars its most likely
targets - women -from full participation in the national economy.
For example, studies report that almost 50 percent of rape victims
lose their jobs or are forced to quit in the aftermath of the crime.
Even the fear of gender-based violence affects the economy
because it deters women from taking jobs in certain areas or at
certain hours that pose a significant risk of such violence.
This was precisely the rationale on which the Supreme Court
relied in upholding the 1964 Civil Rights Act with respect to race
(and presumably, sex as well).
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
85 Fine, supra note 78, at 262 (stating that "[b]ecause there is no general
federal police power, Congress had to rely extensively on the Commerce Clause
for the authority to enact VAWA") (footnotes omitted).
86 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a).
87 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
88 See, e.g., Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 1999); Liu v.
Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 477 (D.R.I. 1999); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375,
1422 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996).
89 Brzonkala v. Virginia, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), affd sub
nom United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); see Linda Greenhouse,
Supreme Court to Rule on Law that Allows Rape Victims to Sue Attackers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at A20 (stating that "[t]he Fourth Circuit was the first
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was poised to answer the question as to whether Lopez's invalida-
tion of the GFSZA would lead to a similar result for Section 13981
of the VAWA.
B. United States v. Morrison
1. Background and Speculation
United States v. Morrison initially began with the caption of
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University9° in 1995,
when Christy Brzonkala, who had been a freshman at Virginia
Polytechnic and State University ("VPSU"), filed a complaint
against two VPSU football players, 9' in the District Court for the
Western District of Virginia for an alleged rape committed against
her in September 1994 in a dormitory room at VPSU.92 The suit
by Brzonkala was the first action to be brought under the civil
rights provision.93 The District Court in Brzonkala held the civil
rights provision unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.94
After an appeal, the Fourth Circuit, in a divided opinion, reversed
appeals court to decide the constitutionality of the [VAWA]").
90 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) [hereinafter "Brzonkala "].
91 See 169 F.3d at 827. Brzonkala also sued the university for violating Title
IX for its "fail[ure] to take prompt remedial action in response to the sexually
hostile environment cause by the gang rape, in flagrant violation of established
sexual harassment law... [and for] discriminat[ing] against her on the basis of
sex in conducting its disciplinary proceedings." Brief of Appellant at 7-8,
Brzonkala v. Virginia, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
92 Appellant's Brief at 2, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
93 Court to Rule on Authority of Congress, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 1999, at
A7.
94 See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 801
(W.D. Va. 1996) (holding that "[the] VAWA is an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress's power, unjustified under either the Commerce Clause or the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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the district court's decision.95 This decision was soon vacated 96
and the Fourth Circuit reheard the case en banc in March 1999.
97
Relying on Lopez,98 the full panel of the Fourth Circuit
invalidated Section 13981 as being an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.99 The panel
held that the civil rights provision "neither regulates an economic
activity nor contains a jurisdictional element" to ensure that each
specific application of the regulation involves an activity that in
fact substantially affects interstate commerce."° The Supreme
Court granted certiorari thereafter in September 1999.101
With five years of speculation over whether Lopez was simply
an aberration in the Supreme Court's sixty year history of non-
interference with congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause, and with varying conclusions as to the constitutionality of
the civil rights provision reaching a crescendo in the lower
courts, 10 2 Morrison provided the Supreme Court the opportunity
to resolve the question over Lopezs significance.
" See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 973 (4th
Cir. 1997) [hereinafter "Brzonkala Ir']. The court stated that "it is apparent that
Congress took great care to detail its findings and support its conclusion that
VAWA was within its commerce authority." Id.
9 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 [hereinafter
"Brzonkala IT].
97 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) [hereinafter "Brzonkala II'].
98 See id. at 851 (stating that the impact on interstate commerce is not direct,
"it is almost precisely analogous to the attenuated, though undoubtedly real,
relationship asserted to exist between guns in school zones and interstate
commerce").
9 169 F.3d at 826 (holding that "section 13981 exceeds Congress' power
under both the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, and the Enforcement
Clause of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
'0 Brzonkala II1, 169 F.3d at 833. Further, the Court stated that "[the civil
rights provision] cannot be sustained on the authority of Lopez nor any of the
Court's previous Commerce Clause holdings, as a constitutional exercise of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce." Id.
'1l United States. v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
102 See, e.g., supra notes 88-89.
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2. Supreme Court Analysis
One commentator stated that "[p]rior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Lopez, there would have been no question of [the civil
rights provision's] constitutionality."'' 0 3 However, on May 15,
2000, the Supreme Court answered the question of Lopez's
significance in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 4 In a methodi-
cal 5-4 opinion, again authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,"°5 the
Court invalidated the civil rights provision as exceeding Congress'
power to regulate activity under the Commerce Clause."°
The Morrison Court stated that it is fundamental that there are
limits to congressional action under the Constitution.0 7 More
importantly, the Court stated that its analysis of whether an activity
has a substantial relation to interstate commerce was controlled by
the Lopez framework.'0 8 Perhaps foreshadowing the fate of
103 Renshaw, supra note 3, at 841.
'o See United States v. Kee, 2000 WL 863117, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. June 27,
2000) (stating "[Morrison] reaffirms the standard set in Lopez"); see also
William L. Church, The Eastern Enterprises Case: New Vigor for Judicial
Review?, 2000 WIs. L. REv. 547, 571 n.84 (2000) (stating that "[w]e recently
learned how important Lopez was").
1"5 Lopez also was decided 5-4, with the same judges being in the majority
and minority in both cases. See David G. Savage, High Court to Rule on Rights
of Grandparents, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at Al (stating "the court's five
conservatives... have voted as a bloc in recent years to strengthen states' rights
and to limit the power of Congress").
'06 In Morrison, the Supreme Court also declared the civil rights provision
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 120 S. Ct. at 1759 (holding that
"Congress' power under § 5 does not extend to the enactment of § 13981"). As
previously stated, this portion of the opinion is beyond the scope of this paper
and will not be discussed.
107 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748 (stating that "[e]very law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the
Constitution").
108 See id. at 1745. Before beginning its analysis of Section 13981 under the
Lopez analysis, the majority stated that "[slince Lopez most recently canvassed
and clarified our case law governing this third category of Commerce Clause
regulation, it provides the proper framework for conducting the required analysis
of § 13981." Id. at 1749. See also Gamrath, supra note 81 at 453 (noting that
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Section 13981, the Court began its analysis by explicitly stating
that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined and limited ...
[and that] those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten."'' 9 Al-
though the Court proclaimed that "[d]ue respect for the decisions
of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate
a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress
has exceeded its congressional bounds,"' the Court's analysis
revealed that it had a very expansive definition of the word "plain,"
as Section 13981 was invalidated despite specific congressional
findings that gender-based violence negatively impacted interstate
commerce. " '
The Morrison Court acknowledged Lopez's recognition that
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has evolved over time" 2 and
that "in the years since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.," 3
Congress has had considerably greater latitude in regulating
conduct and transactions under the Commerce Clause than our
previous case law permitted.""... However, the Morrison majority,
continuing where Lopez left off, reiterated Lopez's admonition that
"even under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, Congress' regulatory authority is not without effective
bounds.""..5 Moreover, citing Lopez, the Morrison Court stated
that:
"[tihe Court in Morrison relied heavily on Lopez").
'09 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch.) 137, 176 (1803)).
110 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Morrison Court further
stated that there was a "presumption of constitutionality" present. Id.
.. See id. at 1752 (stating that "§ 13981 is supported by numerous findings
regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and
their families") (citations omitted).
12 Id. at 1748 (stating that "interpretation of the Commerce Clause has
changed as our Nation has developed").
"3 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
1| Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748 (citation omitted).
15 Id. (citation omitted); see also Santiago v. Alonso, 96 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62
(D. P.R. 2000) (stating "even those cases which greatly expanded Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause had recognized that congressional power was
subject to outer limits"); Kolenc, supra note 61 at 873 (stating that the
"expansion of the commerce power reached its apogee with the Court's support
of Title H of the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
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[E]ven [our] modem-era precedents which have expanded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm
that this power is subject to outer limits. In Jones &
Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the
interstate commerce power must be considered in the light
of our dual system of government and may not be extend-
ed so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government." 6
The Morrison Court recognized that several factors controlled
its decision in Lopez 1I7 and reaffirmed the Lopez demarcation of
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under
the Commerce Clause." 8 The Court stated that Section 13981
should be analyzed under the third category of activities - the
substantially affects commerce test - given the statute's "focus on
gender-motivated violence wherever it occurs (rather than violence
directed at the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, interstate
markets, or things or persons in interstate commerce).""' 9 Follow-
ing the framework of the Lopez analysis, the Morrison Court first
concluded that the civil rights provision did not regulate economic
activity and that there was no precedent for upholding the regula-
tion of non-economic activity. Specifically, the Court stated that:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity. While we need not adopt
a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus
far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Com-
merce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where
that activity is economic in nature. 20
116 Morrison, i20 S. Ct. at 1748-49 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
117 See id. at 1749.
118 See id; see also, supra Part I (describing these three categories).
"9 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749.
120 Id. at 1751 (citation omitted). Cf United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292,
296 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that "Congress may regulate to prevent the inhibition
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Second, "[1]ike the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in
Lopez, section 13981 contains no jurisdictional element establishing
that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce." 12' Third, the Morrison Court
stated that "[i]n contrast with the lack of congressional findings
that we faced in Lopez, section 13981 is supported by numerous
findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated
violence has on victims and their families." 122 Responding to
these findings, however, the Court added that:
the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by
itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation. As we stated in Lopez, '[S]imply because
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so.' Rather, '[w]hether particular operations affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the consti-
tutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately
a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be
settled finally only by this Court. ' 2 3
For five years, proponents of the civil rights provision's constitu-
tionality had distinguished Lopez and staked their claim as to the
civil rights provision's constitutionality based on the presence of the
or diminution of interstate commerce... even when the activity controlled is not
itself commercial") (citation omitted). The majority in Morrison criticized Justice
Souter's "downplay[ing] [of] the role that the economic nature of the regulated
activity plays in [its] Commerce Clause analysis" and for his lack of recognition
that Wickard dealt with a commercial activity. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750.
'21 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
122 Id. at 1752 (citations to congressional record omitted).
123 Id. (citation omitted).
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findings in its legislative history. 24 In one breath the Court
vanquished this contention.
Finally, the Morrison Court concluded that accepting the
presence of congressional findings to be dispositive as to the
constitutionality of a statute had the potential to allow Congress to
regulate anything it wished without regard to the limitations of
congressional power found in the Constitution. 125 Specifically, the
Morrison Court stated that "Congress' findings are substantially
weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily on a method of
reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to
maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers.' 26
124 Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects interstate
commerce:
by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging
in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved in interstate commerce; ... by
diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs,
and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.
Id. (citations omitted).
125 The Morrison Court concluded under the third category of Lopez that:
Given these findings and petitioners' arguments, the concern that we
expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to
completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and
local authority seems well founded. The reasoning that petitioners
advance seeks to follow the but-for causal chain from the initial
occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been
the prime object of the States' police power) to every attenuated effect
upon interstate commerce. If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would
allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide,
aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment,
production, transit, or consumption. Indeed, if Congress may regulate
gender-motivated violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any
other type of violence since gender-motivated violence, as a subset of
all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the
larger class of which it is part.
Id. at 1752-53.
126 Id. at 1752. Although the GFSZA did not have accompanying legislative
findings, the Lopez Court rested its decision "in part on the fact that the link
between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was
attenuated." Id. at 1751. It was under this prong of its analysis where the
Government had posited its so-called "cost of crime" and "national productivity"
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The Court specifically pointed to the Congress' attempt to
connect gender-motivated violence to interstate commerce as being
analogous to the method of reasoning already rejected in Lo-
pez. 127 The Court was deeply concerned, yet again, as to the
limitless areas that could potentially be regulated by Congress if
Section 13981 was upheld. 128 The Court ultimately concluded that
it:
accordingly reject[s] the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based
solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local. In recogniz-
ing this fact we preserve one of the few principles that has
been consistent since the [Commerce] Clause was adopted.
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that
is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the
province of the States. 129
Ironically, the presence of the extensive congressional findings
- the element that commentators believed would ultimately
distinguish Section 13981 from Section 922(q) of the GFSZA -
proved to undermine the VAWA's constitutionality as well. The
Court believed that accepting these findings would "completely
obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority"'130 and "would allow Congress to regulate any crime so
arguments. Id.
127 Id. at 1752.
128 The Court stated that:
Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating
violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well
to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national
economy is undoubtedly significant .... Under our written Constitu-
tion, however, the limitation of congressional authority is not solely a
matter of legislative grace.
Id. at 1753.
129 Id. at 1754 (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 1752.
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long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has
substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consump-
tion.' 13 1
The Court noted that if the petitioners' "but-for"'' 32 reasoning
were accepted, then Congress would not be limited to regulating
gender-motivated violence, but also other forms of violence and
other areas traditionally viewed as being within the State's concern
such as family law 133 "and other areas of traditional state regula-
tion since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and child-
rearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant.' ' 34
Most poignantly, the Court stated that "[u]nder our written
Constitution ... the limitation of congressional authority is not
solely a matter of legislative grace."'
135
Despite the commendable motivation to enact the civil rights
provision of the VAWA, the Morrison Court made the judicially
correct decision by invalidating it. 136 However, the Morrison
Court can be criticized not for the ends it reached, but rather, for
the analytical means which it employed to get there.
131 Id. at 1752-53.
132 Id. at 1752.
133 See Laura W. Morgan, The Federalization of Child Support a Shift in the
Ruling Paradigm: Child Support as Outside the Contours of "Family Law", 16
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 195 (1999) (stating that '"[f]amily law' has long
been singled out by the United States Supreme Court as the one area, more than
any other, into which the federal government may not intrude, either by
legislation, regulation, or assertion of federal jurisdiction").
"' Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753 (footnote and citations omitted).
135 Id.
136 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted as much when in the final paragraph of the
Court's opinion where he stated that "Petitioner Brzonkala's complaint alleges
that she was the victim of a brutal assault .... If the allegations here are true,
no civilized system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy for the conduct
of respondent Morrison." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759.
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III. CRITICISM OF MORRISON
A. The Morrison Majority Manipulated the Traditional
Standard of Review in Its Analysis of Section 13981 's
Constitutionality
The Morrison Court can be criticized for its manipulation of the
standard of review under the "substantially affects test" in reaching
its ultimate conclusion.'37 The Court refused to articulate a new
standard of review, although it effectively created one. It seems
evident that the Morrison Court desired to invalidate the civil rights
provision 38 while attempting to maintain stability in what, prior
to Lopez, had evolved to be a fairly cogent doctrine in Commerce
137 One commentator made this critique of the Lopez Court as well stating
that "[tihe Lopez Court ... mischaracteriz[ed] precedent." Peter J. Liuzzo,
Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University: The
Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act -- Recognizing that Violence
Targeted at Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 367, 387
(1997).
138 Justice Souter criticized the Court for distinguishing between commercial
and non-commercial activities under the substantially affects test and for its
manipulation of the standard of review, all in the name of the Court implement-
ing its federalism ideology. Justice Souter stated that:
[In the minds of the majority there is a new animating theory that
makes categorical formalism seem useful again. Just as the old
formalism had value in the service of an economic conception, the new
one is useful in serving a conception of federalism. It is the instrument
by which assertions of national power are to be limited in favor of
preserving a supposedly discernible, proper sphere of state autonomy
to legislate or refrain from legislating as the individual States see fit.
The legitimacy of the Court's current emphasis on the noncommercial
nature of regulated activity, then, does not turn on any logic serving
the text of the Commerce Clause or on the realism of the majority's
view of the national economy. The essential issue is rather the strength
of the majority's claim to have a constitutional warrant for its current
conception of a federal relationship enforceable by this Court through
limits on otherwise plenary commerce power.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1768 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Clause jurisprudence. 3 9 The impetus behind the majority's
approach was its desire to reinforce its federalism views, 4 ' which
have been a hallmark of the Rehnquist Court over the past
decade. 141
Although Morrison, like Lopez, claimed not to have overruled
any cases and simply clarified Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Morrison decision cannot be reconciled with established prece-
dent. 142 Because both Lopez and Morrison claimed not to be
overruling prior Commerce Clause cases - which held that
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause would be
valid if there were a rational basis to find the regulated activity had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce - these two decisions
' See id. at 1773 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that by the majority's
opinion," [c]ases standing for the sufficiency of substantial effects are not
overruled; cases overruled since 1937 are not quite revived").
"4 Lustig, supra note 7, at A4 (explaining that the reason "[w]hy the Court
in Lopez and Morrison chose to repudiate precedent and not defer to the
expressed judgment of Congress ... can only be explained as the handiwork of
a Court willing to reshape constitutional law to advance its conservative political
agenda").
141 See Linda Greenhouse, States Rights Adherents on Top Court Appear to
Be Given Pause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at A20 (stating "the Court's
federalism divide has developed over the last several years"); Michael W.
McConnell, Let the States Do It, Not Washington, WALL ST. J., March 29, 1999
at 17 (noting that "[flor the past decade the Supreme Court has been reviewing
an old but important idea that the powers vested in the federal government are
not limited."). In recent years the Supreme Court has decided several cases that
have returned power to the States. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding sections of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 unconstitutional); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997) (holding sections of the Brady Hand Gun Violence Prevention
Act unconstitutional); see also Hatzimichalis, supra note 1, at 726 (stating that
"[t]he Court, in its decisions in Ashcroft, Printz, New York, and [Reno v.]
Condon[,] made one thing patently clear: that it-and no other coordinate branch
of government-will be the final arbiter of federalism and that the Court will
take an active role in preserving our system of dual sovereignty") (footnotes
omitted).
142 See, e.g., Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1765 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
"[the majority's] characterization of [the] substantial effects [test] has no support
in our cases"); Ellis, supra note 17, at 102 (commenting that "[t]he [Lopez]
majority's decision is inconsistent with precedent").
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have created and will further create chaos in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, both in Congress and in the courts because it is
unclear whether a new doctrine has emerged, and if so, what this
doctrine is.
Historically the Supreme Court and lower federal courts gave
great deference to Congress in regulating activities under the
Commerce Clause. 14 3 Courts would merely look to see whether
Congress' determination that the activity being regulated substan-
tially affected interstate commerce was rational, 1" although
determining the statute's constitutionality was stated to ultimately
be a judicial rather than a legislative function. 145 A reviewing
court would 'invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause only if it [was] clear that there [was] no rational basis for
a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
143 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (stating that
"where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before
them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to
the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end."); Rebecca E. Hatch,
Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Surviving the Substantial Effects of
United States v. Lopez, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 423, 423 (1997) (noting that
"[h]istorically, the Supreme Court ... has given substantial deference to
Congress in the enactment of legislation based on the Commerce Clause"); see
Chris A. Rauschl, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ.:
Violence Against Women, Commerce, and the Fourteenth Amendment - Defining
Constitutional Limits, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1601, 1611 (1997) (observing that
"[t]raditionally, the Court evaluated Congress's conclusions regarding a regulated
activity's nexus to interstate commerce with a deferential rational basis standard
of review").
" Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
277 (1981) (stating that "[when] Congress has determined that an activity affects
interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is
rational"); Hatch, supra note 143 at 423 n.1 (providing examples of legislation
found constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
145 See 120 S. Ct. at 1752 (stating that "[slimply because Congress may
conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does
not necessarily make it so") (citations omitted). Justice Souter, dissenting from
the majority in Morrison stated that "[t]he business of the courts is to review the
congressional assessment, not for soundness but simply for the rationality of
concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in fact." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1760
(Souter, J., dissenting).
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commerce, or that there [was] no reasonable connection between
the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.' ' 146
Under the rational basis test, "the Court typically defers to the
wisdom of the legislature if a rational basis for the statute could
exist." 141 The court in Ericson v. Syracuse University,148 for
instance, stated that "[a] federal court should pause long and hard
before declaring unconstitutional a statutory provision that is the
product of such lengthy inquiry and detailed findings." 149 In
contrast to the deference afforded to Congress by the Ericson court,
the Fourth Circuit stated in Gibbs v. Babbit'5 ° that "[i]t is our...
duty [as a court] to independently evaluate whether 'a rational
basis exist[s] for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently
affect[s] interstate commerce.' 15 This statement seems to ex-
press the import of Lopez where the Supreme Court indicated it
would not simply defer to Congress' unstated and undocumented
conclusion that there is such a rational basis but will conduct its
own "independent evaluation"' 152 of the connection to commerce.
The Court arguably expressed an eagerness to examine legislative
findings in evaluating the congressional judgment.153 Although
146 Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (footnote and
citations omitted).
147 Fine, supra note 78 at 267; see Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 534 (stating
that "the Supreme Court has taken a highly deferential approach to congressional
determinations that a regulated activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce").
148 45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding the civil rights provision
constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
9 Id. at 346; see also Lustig, supra note 7, at A4 (stating that "[p]ost-1937
case law ... established that it was the task of Congress, with its greater
institutional capacity for gathering evidence and taking testimony, and not the
Court, to determine if there was a sufficient causal connection between the
regulated activity and its affect on interstate commerce").
150 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Gibbs v. Norton, 2001 WL
137648.
"' 214 F.3d at 490 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
152 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
113 Id. Justice Souter, dissenting in Morrison, stated that under the majority's
analysis "the 'substantial effects' analysis is not a factual enquiry, for Congress
in the first instance with subsequent judicial review looking only to the
rationality of the congressional conclusion, but one of a rather different sort,
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such findings are not required and a statute could be upheld
without them, the Lopez Court stated that their presence would be
helpful when an activity's nexus to interstate commerce was not
"visible to the naked eye.' 4 However, as Morrison made abun-
dantly clear, the presence of congressional findings still may not
change the outcome of a case. If findings are not to be looked at
more than superficially, what is actually embodied in the Court's
"independent evaluation" still remains to be seen after Morri-
son. 155
Although the language in Lopez suggested that the standard of
review being employed might be slightly higher than a simple
rational basis test in evaluating regulation of non-economic activity
- "rational basis" by Congress plus an "independent evaluation" by
the Court pursuant to its own criteria - the Court did not affirma-
tively reject the rational basis test as the sole standard of re-
view.156 Hence, Section 13981 could have been evaluated under
the rational basis test with the congressional findings supporting
Section 13981 obviating the necessity for an "independent
dependent upon a uniquely judicial competence." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1764
(Souter, J., dissenting).
"5 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563; see also Rauschl, supra note 143, at 1610
(stating that the Supreme Court in Lopez held "that it did not require congressio-
nal findings, but suggested that they would be helpful when a regulated activity's
nexus to interstate commerce was not 'visible to the naked eye"') (footnote
omitted).
... See, e.g., Peter Arey Gilbert, The Migratory Bird Rule After Lopez:
Questioning the Value of State Sovereignty in the Context of Wetland Regulation,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1695, 1721 (1998) (commenting that "Lopez['s]
analysis reflects the Court's newfound willingness to add factors to the
Commerce Clause analysis").
156 Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (stating
"since Lopez did not overturn or limit the rationality test under Hodel, the
numerous hearings and substantial documentation amassed by Congress evinced
a rational basis for finding that gender-based violence sufficiently affected
interstate commerce") (citation omitted); Renshaw, supra note 3, at 833 (stating
that "Lopez does not present a new test for Commerce Clause challenges but
rather affirms the rational basis test previously used by the Supreme Court").
Even a district court that invalidated the civil rights provision stated that "in the
wake of Lopez, the proper standard of review remains the . . . 'rational basis
test'." Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 628, 634 (M.D. La. 1999).
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evaluation" by the Court. Despite numerous district courts having
evaluated Section 13981 using the rational basis test in conjunction
with Congress' findings,' 57 nowhere in the Morrison Court's
opinion did it even mention "rational basis." Therefore, it is evident
that the Court employed a new standard of review, or at least
adhered to the unarticulated standard that it propounded in Lopez.
Justice David H. Souter, dissenting from the majority in
Morrison, recounted the voluminous findings Congress amassed
prior to enacting the civil rights provision, and stated that "the
sufficiency of the evidence before Congress to provide a rational
basis for the finding [that gender-motivated violence substantially
effects interstate commerce] cannot seriously be questioned." '158
Justice Souter correctly observed that:
Although a new jurisprudence has not emerged with any
distinctness, it is clear that some congressional conclusions
about obviously substantial, cumulative effects on com-
merce are being assigned lesser values than the once-stable
doctrine would assign them. 159
Given Justice Souter's comments and the analysis above, it is clear
that the Morrison Court adopted a new standard of scrutiny. Its
newly crafted independent evaluation consists of zero deference to
congressional findings while the Court conducts its own indepen-
dent evaluation as to the regulated activity's connection to interstate
commerce with principles of federalism serving as a guard against
plenary congressional power.
"' See Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 539 (stating that "the role of the courts...
is to ensure that Congress has a rational basis for its findings. Given the
extensive compilation of data, testimony and reports, 'it is unlikely Congress
would spend four years determining the effects of gender-based violence on
interstate commerce for the sole purpose of overcoming the rationality test and
the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez ... This Court is satisfied that the
congressional findings underlying the VAWA should be regarded as more than
a mere pretext for congressional authority").
'58 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
"9 Id. at 1764.
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B. The Morrison Majority (Covertly) Propounded a New
Standard of Review
The Morrison Court rejected the rational basis test as the sole
criterion for evaluating intrastate non-economic activities' 6° and
propounded a new standard of review in its place. 161 It appears
that the Morrison majority adopted the following test in evaluating
the constitutionality of a statute regulating under the "substantially
affects" commerce test. As noted, the Court considered four factors
but its test can be compacted down into the following: First, the
Court will look to see whether the statute pertains to commercial
or economic activity. 162 If it regulates such an activity, it appears
that the rational basis test will be employed and the statute will be
almost universally upheld.1 63 Under such scrutiny congressional
findings, if present, will be afforded deference. If the statute does
"6 See, e.g., id. (stating that the majority's affording Congress' findings less
deference "are accomplished not by any express repudiation of the substantial
effects test or its application through the aggregation of individual conduct, but
by supplanting rational basis scrutiny with a new criterion of review").
161 See Lustig, supra note 7, at A4 (commenting that "[blithely ignoring and
rejecting existing precedent, the court in both [Lopez and Morrison] . . . adopted
a form of 'strict scrutiny' of Congressional legislation in which the Court
substituted its own judgment in place of the legislature as to the casual
connection between the activity regulated by Congress and its affect on interstate
commerce in place of the legislature").
161 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749-50. This contention is precisely what Justice
Souter argued in his dissenting opinion in Lopez and is the same theme he again
picked up in his dissent in Morrison. In his Lopez dissent Souter argued that the
Lopez majority "treats deference under the rationality rule as subject to gradation
according to the commercial or noncommercial nature of the immediate subject
of the challenged regulation." 514 U.S. at 608. See also Philpot, supra note 62,
at 782 (stating "in Lopez, the majority upset the traditional analysis by suggesting
that less deference to legislative findings is necessary when the activity regulated
is non-commercial in nature").
163 See Megan Weinstein, The Violence Against Women Act After United
States v. Lopez: Defending the Act From Constitutional Challenge, 12 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 124 (1997) (stating that "[t]o be constitutional under the
Lopez rationale, the intrastate instances of violence against women that section
13981 seeks to regulate must be deemed commercial").
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not regulate economic activity, then the Court will look for a
jurisdictional hook. 64 If one is not present, then an undefined
heightened scrutiny or "independent evaluation" will be applied by
the Court. Under such heightened review, legislative findings are
given little to no weight as the Court evaluates the reasoning
behind the findings. The Morrison Court seemingly requires a
fairly tight nexus between the regulated activity and its connection
to interstate commerce.1 65 The court in United States v. Visn-
ich,166 evaluating the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 922(q) subse-
quent to Morrison being decided, stated that:
[T]he [Morrison] Court focused more on the actuality of
the relationship between the regulated activity and inter-
state commerce, and less on the legislatively-stated link
between the two. This is neither a change nor a modifica-
tion in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but merely a
change in emphasis on one of the several factors the Court
considers in evaluating legislation based upon Congress'
Commerce Clause powers. 167
The Visnich court deemed the Morrison Court to require a
"substantial nexus between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce." 168 The Visnich court correctly interpreted the Morri-
16 See, e.g., United States v. Fleischli, 119 F. Supp. 2d 819, 822 (C.D. Ill.
2000) ("The [Morrison] Court.... was careful to note that a principal infirmity
of ... § 13981 was that the legislation 'contain[ed] no jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce .... [and] that 'such a jurisdictional element
would lend support to the argument that . . .§ 13981 is sufficiently ties to
interstate commerce"') (citations omitted).
165 See United States v. Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(stating "Morrison does place more emphasis on the nexus between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce"); see also Polly McCann Pruneda, The
Lautenberg Amendment: Congress Hit the Mark by Banning Firearms, 30 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 801, 820 (1999) (noting that "the Court's modem approach to the
Commerce Clause ... partially revives the requirement that Congress demon-
strate a clear nexus between the regulated intrastate activity and interstate
commerce").
166 109 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
167 Id. at 761 (footnotes omitted).
168 id. at 761 n.5.
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son Court's heightened scrutiny to require such a connection.
Moreover, the Morrison Court viewed Section 13981 in its
evaluation through the lens of federalism, being concerned over
possible federal intrusion into areas perceived as being within the
realm of the states alone to regulate. 6 9
The Morrison Court adopted the Lopez Court's directive that the
Court must undertake its own independent evaluation of a regulated
activity's connection to interstate commerce and not merely accept
Congress' findings as conclusive as to this nexus. The Morrison
Court was vague, however, in articulating what its "independent
evaluation" actually consists of - that is, how much weight findings
receive and how much concerns about federalism should play.
C. The Morrison Majority Tacitly Adopted a Per Se Rule
Against Commerce Clause Regulation of Intrastate Non-
Economic Activities
Although the Morrison Court claimed that "[it] need not adopt
a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any non-
economic activity,"' 7 it is evident that the Court, by its logic, in
fact did do so.17' The Court also added a caveat, justifying this
statement, by stating that "thus far in our Nation's history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where the activity is economic in nature."' 72 Justice Breyer,
169 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753.
7o Id. at 1751.
"' Id., at 1765 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter opined:
[F]or the majority, not only that there must be some limits to
'commerce,' but that some particular subjects arguably within the
commerce power can be identified in advance as excluded, on the basis
of characteristics other than their commercial effects. Such exclusions
come into sight when the activity regulated is not itself commercial or
when the States have traditionally addressed it in the exercise of the
general police power.
Id. (emphasis added). See Alan J. Heinrich, Symposium on New Directions in
Federalism, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1275, 1276 (2000) (observing that "[u]nder
Morrison, it will be virtually impossible for Congress to regulate noneconomic
activity pursuant to its Commerce Clause power").
172 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751 (citation omitted).
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dissenting as well in Morrison, deemed the Court's holding to be
that "the federal commerce power does not extend to such
'noneconomic' activities as 'noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct' that significantly affects interstate commerce only if we
'aggregate' the interstate 'effect[s]' of individual instances."'' 73
The Morrison majority rejected Congress' findings, holding that
they consisted of attenuated "but-for" reasoning, which, if accepted,
would potentially leave no area outside Congress' reach. 74 The
only way to know for sure whether the Court did not adopt a
categorical rule against upholding the regulation of an intrastate
activity that is claimed in the aggregate to substantially affect
commerce would be for a case to come before the Court which
would require the Court to evaluate a statute that did not have the
so-called causation problems of Section 13981.
IV. PROPOSED STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR INTRASTATE NON-
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
In lieu of the undefined standard the Court used in Morrison,
a new standard of review under the Commerce Clause needs to be
articulated to evaluate those intrastate activities that are claimed to
substantially affect interstate commerce in the aggregate. The
standard this Note proposes would simply articulate the undefined
aspects of the Morrison test.
First, a heightened standard of review should be adopted for
statutes that attempt to regulate non-economic intrastate activity
and are claiming to substantially affect interstate commerce in the
171 Id. at 1774 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
174 Id. at 1751. The Morrison majority stated that:
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example. Under the[se]
theories ... , it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.
Id. (citation omitted).
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aggregate. This would be in lieu of the rational basis test, which
should remain the test to evaluate those statutes that attempt to
regulate commercial activities under the "substantially affects
commerce" test. Under this proposed standard, congressional
findings that a non-economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce would receive little or no deference, unlike the treatment
they would receive with regard to commercial activities.'75 This
approach would not differ with the treatment the Morrison Court
gave the congressional findings. This demarcation between
economic and non-economic activities would stem from prudential
concerns over federalism and the desire to draw a line demarcating
what Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause.
Such a heightened standard of review is prefered over the
rational basis test simply because of the fact that Congress'
Commerce Clause powers are not plenary and there must be limits
under our traditional concepts of federalism. Federalism is a vital
component to the structure of our national Government. 76 There-
fore, as Congress attempts to regulate those activities that appear
further and further removed from commerce - intrastate non-
economic activities that are claimed to substantially affect com-
merce in the aggregate -judicial scrutiny should be more rigorous
175 See, e.g., Lisanne Newell Leasure, Commerce Clause Challenges
Spawned by United States v. Lopez Are Doing Violence to the Violence Against
Women Act (VA WA): A Survey of Cases and the Ongoing Debate Over How the
VAWA Will Fare in the Wake of Lopez, 50 ME. L. REv. 410, 433 (1998)
(commenting that "Justice Souter highlighted the fact that [the Lopez] majority
upset the traditional analysis by indicating that less deference to legislative
findings is appropriate when the regulated activity is non-commercial in nature")
(footnotes omitted).
176 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). In Ashcroft, Justice
O'Connor enumerated the virtues of federalism as follows:
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for
citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more
innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes govern-
ment more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry. Perhaps the principle benefit of the federalist system is a
check on abuses of government power.
Id. at 458 (citations omitted).
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as to the activities' connection to interstate commerce. However,
Congress should not be foreclosed completely from regulating such
if it can meet the Court's independent evaluation of there being a
substantial nexus between the activity and its impact on interstate
commerce. Congressional findings should receive little to no
deference when they concern non-economic activities. The reason
for this is if Congress only had to accumulate extensive findings in
order to establish such a connection between the regulated activity
and interstate commerce, the Court logically cannot refute this
claim and say Congress' decision was irrational and invalidate the
legislation. If congressional findings received the same amount of
deference as they do with review of commercial activities, their
accumulation otherwise would simply serve as pre-requisite to a
court administered rubber stamp to permit regulation under the
Commerce Clause and judicial review would become moot. 177 It
is for this reason that congressional findings should not be deferred
to.
If the rational basis test had been honestly employed by the
Morrison Court, then the Court should have upheld the civil rights
provision just as numerous district courts had done. 178 It would
177 See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 999 (5th Cir. 1997)
(stating that "[c]ongressional findings are not merely playthings of formalism").
178 See, e.g., Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d. 452, 477 (D.RI. 1999) (stating
"this Court cannot conclude that Congress had no rational basis for finding that
gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce"); Williams
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County / Kansas
City, Kansas, 1999 WL 690101, at *3 (D.Kan. Aug. 24, 1999); Kuhn v. Kuhn,
1999 WL 519326, at *10 (N.D. 11. July 15, 1999) (concluding that "Congress
... had a rational basis to conclude that gender-motivated violence substantially
affects interstate commerce"); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 611
(E.D.Wa. 1998) (stating "[tihis Court joins almost all other District Courts which
have addressed the issue in concluding that the Congressional finding has a
rational basis") (citations omitted); Crisonino v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 985 F.
Supp. 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that Congress had a rational basis
for concluding that gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate
commerce); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1422 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (stating
that "this court finds that there was undeniably a rational basis for Congress's
conclusions that gender-motivated violence has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce") (citation omitted), reversed in part, vacated in part 134 F.3d 1339
(8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D.Conn. 1996) (concluding
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have been difficult for the Morrison Court to conclude that
Congress, after holding years of hearings and accumulating a
plethora of findings purporting to establish the effect gender-
motivated violence has on interstate commerce, was irrational in
reaching its conclusion.179 Therefore, the Supreme Court should
adopt a heightened standard of review for intrastate non-economic
activities, under which congressional findings would receive little
to no deference and federalism concerns would play a critical role
in the evaluation."' 0 This would be in contrast to judicial review
of statutes that attempt to regulate commercial activities which
would still be subject to the rational basis test and congressional
findings would be deferred to.
CONCLUSION
If Lopez merely muddled the proverbial waters of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, 8 ' leaving questions unanswered, 8 2 then
Morrison followed in Lopez's wake creating even more chaos for
that "[a] rational basis exists for concluding that gender-based violence... is a
national problem with substantial impact on interstate commerce and thus is a
proper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause").
171 See, e.g., Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d. 64, 68 (D.Mass. 1999) (stating
that "while legislative findings are not conclusive, they are, under the extremely
deferential test used to evaluate the exercise of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause, deserving of the utmost respect"); Goldscheid, supra, note 39
at 123 (stating that the Morrison Court "did not deem irrational Congress's
conclusion that gender-based violence substantially affected interstate com-
merce") (footnote omitted).
18o See, e.g., Rackham, supra, note 15, at 448 (stating "federalism still
provides a meaningful check on an overpowering federal government").
18l See Sara E. Kropf, The Failure of United States v. Lopez: Analyzing the
Violence Against Women Act, 8 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 373, 373
(1999) (stating "[Lopez] muddled the well-settled jurisprudence of the Commerce
Clause").
182 See Mary C. Carty, Doe v. Doe and the Violence Against Women Act: A
Post-Lopez, Commerce Clause Analysis, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 465, 476 (1997)
(stating that "Lopez did not clearly announce what form of heightened judicial
review is appropriate") (footnote omitted); Reynolds, supra note 181, at 374
(commenting that "[t]he [Lopez] majority opinion is notable for the questions it
leaves unanswered").
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an already much debated and misinterpreted doctrine.'83 What is
clear, however, is that it can no longer be denied that the Supreme
Court is reigning in what had developed to be a seemingly limitless
power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause and
aggrandizing power in its own hands."84
Almost immediately after the Morrison decision was an-
nounced, district courts began dismissing cases brought under the
civil rights provision1 85 and rejecting challenges to other stat-
utes. 186 This increased judicial activity is reminiscent of what
183 See Lustig, supra note 7, at A4 (stating "both Lopez and Morrison ...
turned the prevailing Commerce Clause jurisprudence on its head"); See Burdett,
supra note 11, at 1221 (stating that "the Morrison decision has sparked a variety
of emotions in commentators across the country"); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARv. L. REv.
135, 136 (2000) (stating that "[o]n its most obvious level, Morrison represents
the high-water mark to date of this Court's specific notion of federalism").
Moreover, Senator Biden stated that "[t]he damage done to the act is not as bad
as the damage done to American jurisprudence." Linda Greenhouse, Women Lose
Right to Sue Attackers in Federal Court, NY TIMES, May 16, 2000 at A20
(quoting remarks of Senator Biden).
"8 See Lustig, supra note 7, at Al (stating "[with Lopez and Morrison] the
Court has exhibited judicial activism in its most extreme form"); Jennifer L.
Wethington, Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-Violence Against Women Act's
Civil Rights Remedy Exceeds Congress's Powers to Regulate Interstate
Commerce. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), 23 U. ARK.
LrITLE ROCK L. REv. 485, 507 (2001) (suggesting that with Morrison, the
Supreme Court shifted power away from Congress and to itself upsetting "the
delicate federal balance in favor of heightened judicial review of Congress's
actions").
185 See, e.g., Blair v. All Stars Sports Cabaret, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1224
(2000) (dismissing plaintiffs VAWA cause of action).
186 See, e.g., United States v. Feliciano, 2000 WL 1194237 (2d Cir. Aug. 16,
2000) (challenging constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1959); United States v.
Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d 757 (2000) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)); United States v. City of Columbus, 2000 WL 1133166 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 3, 2000), at *4 (concluding that 42 USC § 14141 "cannot be justified
as a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause").
There is also concern that federal environmental regulation passed under the
Commerce Clause might be vulnerable to invalidation due to Morrison. See John
H. Turner, Lopez Lives: Can an Expansive View of Federal Wetlands Regulation
Survive? An Overview of Decisions Regarding the 'Proactive' Reach of the
Commerce Clause, SE88 ALI-ABA 197, 199 (May 31, 2000) (stating that
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occurred just after the Lopez decision was announced. 187 Many
of these cases have adopted the Morrison Court's recognition that
federalism is alive and well'88 and that there are simply things
that must be considered to be solely in the realm of state con-
cern. 1
89
Ultimately, by establishing a heightened standard of review for
intrastate non-economic activities, and not simply adopting an
untenable per se rule,190 the Court can articulate the location of
the edge of the proverbial Rubicon that Congress will not be
allowed to cross in enacting legislation under the Commerce
Clause, unless it can pass the Court's independent evaluation.
However, a per se rule is an unacceptable solution as Congress
"[rlecent Court decisions have led to considerable speculation that the federal
environmental statutes may no longer be on sound constitutional footing").
187 See Comment, Closing the Loopholes in Domestic Violence Laws: The
Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.... 922(G)(9), 19 PACE L. REv. 445, 482 (1999)
(stating that "[u]pon the United States Supreme Court's rendering its decision in
... Lopez, the legal community vehemently challenged any Congressional
enactment as a usurpation of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause")
(footnote omitted).
188 See, e.g., United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 2000).
Following suit, the Wang court stated:
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local. In recognizing this fact we preserve one of the
few principles that has been consistent since the Clause was adopted.
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in
interstate commerce has always been the province of the States.
Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which
the Founders denied the National Govemment and reposed in the
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims.
Id. at 240 (citing Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754).
189 See, e.g., Chang v. S. Maxwell, 102 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318 (D. Md. 2000)
(concluding that "disagreement[s] over control of ... trusts ... in the context
of divorce and child custody disputes that are clearly matters of state rather than
of federal concern") (citing United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1777).
'" See Perry A. Craft & Arshad (Paku) Khan, A Summary of the 1999-2000
U.S. Supreme Court Civil Decisions, 36-OCT TENN. B.J. 18, 22 (2000) (stating
that "[u]nder the Commerce Clause, Congress may only regulate local economic
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce").
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should be afforded some maneuverability to potentially regulate
matters that are national in scope although they might be classified
as non-economic intrastate activity. The reason for this is that as
American society continues to evolve, Congress should have
regulatory flexibility 9 - as it had when the nation developed in
the twentieth century 92 - just not as expansive as then, 193 and
kept in check by the Court. The Court needs though to articulate
the factors encompassed in its independent evaluation so that
Congress has some guidance in legislating. It is undeniable that the
civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act was
passed for laudable objectives, but, if Lopez and Morrison mean
anything at all - despite their confusion - it is that "the power to
regulate commerce, though broad ... has limits."'
194
191 Cf Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the
Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the "Judicial Power", 80 B.U. L. REV.
967, 1012 (2000) (commenting that the Supreme Court has placed "new-found
limitations on congressional regulatory authority") (footnote omitted).
192 See David C. Feola and David R. Fine, The "New Federalism": Ignore
It at Your Peril, 29-Nov. COLO. LAW. 5 (2000) (stating that "[t]he Supreme
Court, throughout most of the twentieth century, has used the Commerce Clause
to expand power over a wide range of commercial and social activity").
' See, e.g., Burdett, supra note 11, at 1221 (stating that "Morrison is
viewed by many as a 'watershed case,' as it 'denigrates congressional power
to a level not seen since the 1930s"') (footnote omitted).
194 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (internal citation marks and
citation omitted).
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